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    Utilitarian resource assignment

    Berenbrink, P., Goldberg, L.A., Goldberg, P.W. and Martin, R. (2004) Utilitarian resource assignment. Technical Report. Department of Computer Science, Coventry, UK.

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    Abstract

    This paper studies a resource allocation problem introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou. The scenario is modelled as a multiple-player game in which each player selects one of a finite number of known resources. The cost to the player is the total weight of all players who choose that resource, multiplied by the ``delay'' of that resource. Recent papers have studied the Nash equilibria and social optima of this game in terms of the L_{infinity} cost metric, in which the social cost is taken to be the maximum cost to any player. We study the L_1 variant of this game, in which the social cost is taken to be the sum of the costs to the individual players, rather than the maximum of these costs. We give bounds on the size of the coordination ratio, which is the ratio between the social cost incurred by selfish behavior and the optimal social cost; we also study the algorithmic problem of finding optimal (lowest-cost) assignments and Nash Equilibria. Additionally, we obtain bounds on the ratio between alternative Nash equilibria for some special cases of the problem.

    Item Type: Monograph (Technical Report)
    Uncontrolled Keywords: technicalreport
    Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
    Divisions: Faculty of Science > Computer Science
    Depositing User: Russell Boyatt
    Date Deposited: 28 Oct 2011 16:21
    Last Modified: 01 Nov 2012 18:05
    URI: http://eprints.dcs.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1518

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